Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.031 |
Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations | |
Freeman, Matthew A.1; Anderson, Christopher M.2 | |
2017-04-01 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
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ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 134 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | Common-pool resource regulations are developed through a combination of resource assessment, economic analysis, and politics. We investigate a management institution wherein users can influence a proposed common extraction cap through costly effort, or lobbying. Our model incorporates two user types: a few harvesters who efficiently handle extraction externalities, and a larger number who do not. Without regulation, we observe the efficient harvesters extracting more than the social optimum, consistent with Nash equilibrium. Given the opportunity to lobby, we observe harvesters contributing to move inefficient proposed caps toward more efficient levels. However, lobbying is a public good and, consistent with Nash equilibrium, the user type with weaker preference free rides on the type with stronger preferences leading to insufficient lobbying and inefficient regulations, especially when the cap must be lowered. This highlights an important limitation to participatory governance mechanisms when participation is costly. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000395219300014 |
WOS关键词 | COLLECTIVE CHOICE ; MANAGEMENT ; COMANAGEMENT ; INSTITUTIONS ; CONSERVATION ; FISHERIES ; RULES |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/15635 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | 1.1650 Robinson Dr North, St Petersburg, FL 33710 USA; 2.Washington Univ, Sch Aquat & Fishery Sci, Box 355020, St Louis, MO 63130 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Freeman, Matthew A.,Anderson, Christopher M.. Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2017,134. |
APA | Freeman, Matthew A.,&Anderson, Christopher M..(2017).Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,134. |
MLA | Freeman, Matthew A.,et al."Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 134(2017). |
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