Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.08.019 |
Forest Preservation Under REDD plus Schemes With Incentives Distortions | |
Strand, Jon | |
2018-12-01 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS |
ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2018 |
卷号 | 154页码:343-348 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | This analysis is based on a model of REDD+ implementation where a sponsor, assumed to be either "benevolent" (altruistic) a toward farmers, or completely selfish, compensates a farmer for the protection of a patch of rainforest under the latter's control. This model is applied to cases with less effective ("diluted") incentives, in two ways: the sponsor must compensate all farmers in a group instead of only the single farmer targeted ("group incentives"); and a fraction of REDD+ payments is captured by an elite not directly involved in forest protection, and not worthy of support by a benevolent sponsor ("elite capture"). I extend the traditional REDD + literature by including "benevolent" sponsors who are fully concerned with the welfare of the target (farmer) group. Payments are then increased, perhaps dramatically; but reduced by a selfish sponsor. An efficient solution can then be attained by a benevolent sponsor, albeit only for a high PES payment. With elite capture, payments are reduced for all sponsors, and full efficiency never attained. With selfish sponsors no viable PES scheme may exist. When the group incentive scheme rewards only farmers who save their forests, incentives are not eroded by the scheme. |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000446282700030 |
WOS关键词 | ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES ; PAYMENTS ; CONSERVATION ; COMMONS |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/16018 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | World Bank, Dev Res Grp, 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Strand, Jon. Forest Preservation Under REDD plus Schemes With Incentives Distortions[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2018,154:343-348. |
APA | Strand, Jon.(2018).Forest Preservation Under REDD plus Schemes With Incentives Distortions.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,154,343-348. |
MLA | Strand, Jon."Forest Preservation Under REDD plus Schemes With Incentives Distortions".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 154(2018):343-348. |
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