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DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.10.008 |
Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives | |
Keppler, Jan Horst | |
2017-06-01 | |
发表期刊 | ENERGY POLICY
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ISSN | 0301-4215 |
EISSN | 1873-6777 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 105 |
文章类型 | Article;Proceedings Paper |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | France |
英文摘要 | Economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in deregulated electricity markets. Ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets, CRMs are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner, lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination. They are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical benchmark model that argues that competitive energy-only markets with VOLL pricing provide adequate levels of capacity. While the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity market design, it ignores the two market failures that make CRMs the practically appropriate and theoretically justified policy response to capacity issues. First, energy-only markets fail to internalize security-of-supply externalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private non-consumption of electricity. Second, when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are discretely sized, investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest. After presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model, this paper conceptualizes security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding design of CRMs. |
英文关键词 | Electricity markets Capacity remuneration mechanisms VOLL pricing Investment Security of supply externalities Asymmetric investment incentives |
领域 | 气候变化 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI ; ISSHP ; ISTP |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000400532900054 |
WOS类目 | Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/18178 |
专题 | 气候变化 |
作者单位 | Univ Paris 09, Pl Marechal Lattre Tassigny, F-75775 Paris 16, France |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Keppler, Jan Horst. Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives[J]. ENERGY POLICY,2017,105. |
APA | Keppler, Jan Horst.(2017).Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives.ENERGY POLICY,105. |
MLA | Keppler, Jan Horst."Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives".ENERGY POLICY 105(2017). |
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