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DOI | [db:DOI] |
The Strategic Significance of Africa’s Smallest Democracies | |
Judd Devermont | |
2020-09-24 | |
出版年 | 2020 |
国家 | 美国 |
领域 | 地球科学 ; 资源环境 |
英文摘要 | The Strategic Significance of Africa’s Smallest DemocraciesSeptember 24, 2020 In June 2020, Colombian businessman Alex Saab landed in the West African island nation of Cabo Verde. He claimed he was traveling on behalf of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro as a state “agent” on business to obtain humanitarian supplies to help combat the coronavirus pandemic. Cabo Verdean officials promptly arrested Saab, pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice, and agreed to pursue extradition proceedings to the United States. Saab, widely regarded as Maduro’s fixer, is under U.S. sanctions and wanted on suspicion of money laundering. Cabo Verde, which typically receives limited attention relative to regional neighbors such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, suddenly found itself in the middle of one of the U.S. government’s top priorities: the Venezuelan crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Cabo Verde’s role in the U.S.-Venezuelan drama is far from exceptional. Africa’s smallest democracies, especially its island nations, routinely punch above their weight. With populations under 1.5 million people—the World Bank’s marker of a “small state”—Cabo Verde, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles feature in some of the most prominent global challenges, including international justice, geostrategic competition, and transnational threats. Their guest-starring roles in major foreign policy debates upend traditional thinking about U.S. investments and partnerships in Africa, making clear that the continent’s smallest states warrant more attention to advance U.S. global objectives. Democracy and Location, Location, LocationThe continent’s smallest democracies unexpectedly show up in global foreign policy challenges because of their open political and economic systems as well as central locations in strategic waterways and airspaces. Freedom House has identified Cabo Verde, Mauritius, and São Tomé and Príncipe as three of the region’s seven “free” countries. Seychelles is one of the strongest performing “partly free” states in sub-Saharan Africa, sitting on the cusp between “free” and “partly free” status. This commitment to upholding the rule of law presumably spurred Cabo Verde to fulfill its legal obligations under the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention to arrest Saab, with President Jorge Carlos Fonseca telling reporters that “although we’re small, we can’t have a foreign policy or stance that’s secretive, or bashful, as if we were helpless or closed off in our little shell.” A similar values-based agenda may have prompted Seychellois president Danny Faure and former Mauritian president Ameenah Gurib-Fakim to sound the alarm about Covid-19’s effects and lobby for debt relief. Moreover, their open markets and lenient tax systems attract multinational corporations to set up operations and buy property in these countries, though not without some complications. The countries’ locations are equally pivotal. Alex Saab’s plane stopped in Cabo Verde to refuel on its way to Iran, and the island nation has been a stopover for U.S. secretaries of state on their way home following continental trips. Cabo Verde also has served as an emergency landing site for NASA space missions. Furthermore, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe are all located in strategic waterways, explaining the heated courtship by major and middle powers for access and partnerships.
The Problem with Being SmallSub-Saharan Africa’s small democracies, however, face economic, political, and reputational consequences by serving as a backdrop for high-stakes international intrigue. While big states are not immune to these challenges, small states have fewer resources to mitigate or counter negative implications; in a 2014 International Peace Institute report, the author highlighted asymmetric access to information, capacity constraints, and structural barriers to full participation in multilateral settings as specific obstacles.
These countries also have to grapple with the impacts of climate change. According to the United Nations, small island states are highly vulnerable to climate change and the resulting rise in sea level. Specifically, ecologists expect these countries to endure more cyclones, heavy rains, and flooding. While the governments are working to tackle these challenges, including a novel approach by Seychelles to swap 5 percent of its national debt for a cash injection to fight the effects of climate change, it is a herculean task. In addition, Mauritius is currently reeling from a devastating oil spill off its coast, which has jeopardized an internationally recognized biodiversity hotspot and sparked political protests in the capital. All of these countries rely heavily on international tourism, and the current pandemic stands to inflict serious harm to their economies and national debts. Thinking Small and Big to Advance U.S. Policy toward AfricaThe role of Cabo Verde with respect to Venezuela is a feature, not a bug, of the region’s increasing connectedness and importance in the international system. This dynamic requires a new approach to U.S. policy toward Africa. These cases further substantiate that what happens in Africa does not stop at the water’s edge. Africa’s progress and setbacks should be seen in a global context, necessitating a departure from Washington’s siloed approach to the region. If the United States wants to constrain rogue regimes, crackdown on corruption networks, or curb human rights abuses, it must see Africa as part of the answer. The prominence of the continent’s smallest states also raises questions about the balance of resources and U.S. partnerships. U.S. policy toward Africa traditionally has been predicated on working closely with “anchor” or “focus” states, namely the region’s largest countries with sufficient diplomatic, security, or economic heft, to promote U.S. objectives. While this approach has its merits, Africa’s smallest democracies also have unique attributes to respond to global challenges. The answer, however, is not to abandon the big states, but to pursue a parallel approach to preserve close relations with anchor states while developing deeper ties to small states with niche capabilities and ties. Below are five recommendations to elevate and leverage the role of Africa’s smallest democracies to promote U.S. priorities. These are broadly applicable to all African states, but they have special resonance for the continent’s smallest democracies because they receive considerably less attention; no U.S. president has visited any of the four countries, and these countries have rarely been invited to the Oval Office.
Judd Devermont is director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. |
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来源平台 | Center for Strategic & International Studies |
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文献类型 | 科技报告 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/296256 |
专题 | 地球科学 资源环境科学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Judd Devermont. The Strategic Significance of Africa’s Smallest Democracies,2020. |
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