Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
Climate Policy and Innovation in the Absence of Commitment | |
Ashokankur Datta; E. Somanathan | |
2020-11-25 | |
出版年 | 2020 |
国家 | 瑞典 |
领域 | 资源环境 |
英文摘要 | We compare the effects of price and quantity instruments (an emissions tax and a quota with tradable permits) on the incentive to innovate to reduce the cost of an emission-free technology. We assume that the government cannot commit to the level of a policy instrument before R&D occurs but sets the level to be socially optimal after the results of R&D are realized. The equivalence of price and quantity instruments in inducing innovation that is seen in end-of-pipe abatement models does not hold. When the marginal cost of the dirty technology is constant, then a quota can induce R&D, but a tax is completely ineffective. However, if the marginal cost function of the dirty technology is steep enough, then both a tax and a quota with tradable permits can induce R&D, and the tax will do so in a wider range of circumstances. Furthermore, in this case, an R&D subsidy may induce R&D and raise welfare whether a tax or a quota regime is in place. |
URL | 查看原文 |
来源平台 | Environment for Development Initiative |
文献类型 | 科技报告 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/305371 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ashokankur Datta,E. Somanathan. Climate Policy and Innovation in the Absence of Commitment,2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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