Managing the Principal Agent Problem in Bolsa Familia: A look at contextual factors that affect the quality of implementation

doi:10.7249/RR1617

GSTDTAP > 资源环境科学

DOI	10.7249/RR1617
报告编号	RR-1617-ESRC
	Managing the Principal Agent Problem in Bolsa Familia: A look at contextual factors that affect the quality of implementation
	Christian van Stolk; Sunil Patil
	2016
出版年	2016
页数	45
语种	英语
国家	美国
出版者	RAND Corporation
领域	资源环境
英文摘要	Bolsa Familia (BF) is a conditional cash transfer programme introduced in 2003 in Brazil. This report aims to understand the principal agent problem in BF. We do this by running three generalised linear models to find associations between contextual factors such as capacity of agents against outcome measures related to the quality of the provision of services such as the quality of registries. Our findings suggest that those implementing services must have a clear incentive in the programme either through the provision of support under the programme or through the accountability process. Smaller municipalities and those with poorer constituencies tend to have more accurate registries. Health and education services seem to have less incentive to operate in BF as they have no electoral incentive or receive support under BF. Finally, our models show that more integration between BF and health and education services is associated with better reported implementation.
英文关键词	Economic Development Social Services and Welfare Personal Finance Public Sector Governance Brazil Poverty
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来源平台	Rand Corporation
引用统计
文献类型	科技报告
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/4431
专题	资源环境科学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Christian van Stolk,Sunil Patil. Managing the Principal Agent Problem in Bolsa Familia: A look at contextual factors that affect the quality of implementation:RAND Corporation,2016.